债权治理机制与管理者激励安排

Governance of Debts and Incentives for Managers

运用一个不完备契约下的债权融资模型,研究了债权人对公司治理的参与选择和管理者的努力激励设计问题。结果表明,在企业控制权有可能发生向债权人转移的情况下,债权人是否获得企业经营控制权取决于企业经营的真实状态和管理者激励安排下的努力水平选择。当企业经营的真实状态较好时,管理者会主动选择最优的努力水平,债权人的债权回收得到保障,控制权转移不会发生;当企业经营的真实状态较差时,管理者会选择较低的努力水平,债权人有必要获得控制权,并设计一个努力补偿激励安排,以提高管理者努力水平,确保债权回收。

This research is based on an incomplete debt contract mode. Debtor＇s choices of participating in corporate governance and incentives for managers were analyzed. The results show that whether the debtors acquire the control rights of corporate depends on the intrinsic corporate operations and the level of incentives for managers.