摘要
集中于国际主权债重组的理论诠释,并通过对主权债重组中的两个问题——集体行动困境和道德风险的博弈模型建立和分析,讨论如何建立一个解决主权债务重组问题的机制,使遇到债务困难的国家和债权人循此机制解决问题从而减少债权债务双方的损失,总结出处理主权债务问题应特别考虑的几个关系,提出一些启发性的政策建议。
IThis article focuses on the international sovereign debt restructuring and the two issues regarding collective action dilemma and moral hazard. We discuss the mechanism to solve sovereign debt restructuring so to reduce losses of both the creditor and debtor and put up specific issues to be considered to deal with sovereign debts. Finally, we propose some policy recommendations.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期49-52,共4页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
投融资
主权债重组
集体行动困境
道德风险
Investment and finance
Sovereign debt restructuring
Collective action dilemma
Moral hazard