派现行为下的控股股东利益转移问题研究

Empirical Research on Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling behind Cash Dividend

本文运用深市上市公司的数据,对我国上市公司派现与控股股东利益转移行为之间的关系进行了实证分析。结果表明,控股股东将现金股利作为利益转移的方式之一,控股股东控股优势越大,公司派现意愿越强,派现水平也越高;派现意愿与公司上市年限负相关,而与上年配股情况正相关;此外,债务和股权制衡能够在一定程度上制约这种利用派现政策实施的利益转移行为。

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between tunneling and cash dividend based on data from the listed firms on Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The results show that cash dividend is employed by controlling shareholders as a legal and effective method to tunnel. Regression analysis shows that higher concentration of ownership structure leads to higher probability to pay cash dividend and more dividend per share, that willingness to pay cash dividend is negatively related to the time of the firm on the Exchange and the amount of previous years' rights issued. In addition, debt and ownership balance restrict tunneling behaviors behind cash dividend.