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主观业绩评价经验研究综述 被引量:7

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摘要 为了缓解由客观业绩评价指标导致的激励扭曲,企业设计的激励合约通常包含主观业绩评价的内容。主观业绩评价的核心特征是上级对下级的业绩评价结果不能为第三方甚至下级所证实。本文在对主观业绩评价进行概念界定的基础上,从决定因素和后果两个方面对主观业绩评价的经验研究进行了评介,最后对相关研究的未来发展提出了三点建议。
出处 《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第7期46-52,共7页 Foreign Economics & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目<水电企业流域化 集团化 科学化管理理论和方法研究>(批准号:50539130)
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参考文献20

  • 1Baker, G, Gibbons, R, and Murphy, K J. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109(4) : 1125-1156.
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  • 8黄再胜.企业主观业绩评价理论及其发展[J].外国经济与管理,2004,26(8):19-24. 被引量:13
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二级参考文献20

  • 1Baker, George. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1992 , 100: 598-614.
  • 2Baker, George. The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting[R]. A. M. R. Papers and Proc. 2000,90, May.
  • 3Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 1994,109:1125-56.
  • 4Baker, George, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economies , 2002,117 : 39- 84.
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  • 6Bull, Clive. The Existence of Self-enforcing Implicit Contracts[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987 , 102:147-59.
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  • 8Gibbons, Robert. Incentives in Organizations [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 1998, (12) : 115-32.
  • 9Holstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom. Multi-task Principal-agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991,7:24-52.
  • 10Kahn, Charles and Gur Huberman. Two-sided Uncertainty and "up or out" Contracts[J]. Journal of Labor Economics, 1988,(6) :423-44.

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