强制性制度变迁中的“分配性努力”——以中国国有银行体系为例

Distributive Endeavor in Mandatory Transformation of Institution:A Case of China’s State-own Banking System

强制性制度变迁催生鼓励“分配性努力”的制度结构,分利方的讨价还价和制度设计者的激励相容考虑共同导致了“分配性努力”的自我强化,使强制性制度变迁目标的实现在结果上以鼓励“分配性努力”的制度结构为代价。中国国有银行体系就是一个例子;其中沉淀的不良资产是强制性制度变迁中各分利方“分配性努力”所达成的行为均衡,作为租值消散在该领域的累积,其数量可以作为中国市场化改革成本的最小估算值。

Mandatory transformation of institution leads to instituional structure that will stimulate distributive endeavor. Institution designer＇ s consideration on incentive compatibility together with a variety of different interest groups＇ bargaining causes the self-reinforcing of distributive endeavor. In the case of China＇ s state-own banking system, NPLs is the equilibrium of behaviors and its amount is the minimum estimation for China＇ s market economy reform＇ s cost.