IPO盈余“过度包装”的治理机制设计

Designing A Corporate Governance Mechanism for IPO Excessive Earnings Management

中国A股上市公司IPO“过度包装”现象普遍存在,一个根本原因是当IPO公司的价值被高估时,对IPO公司的高定价行为缺乏有效的治理机制。本文在中国特定的环境下,分析了初始公司面临发股收益、持股收益与控制权收益组合时,IPO公司价值被高估没有约束机制以及引入约束时对于公司股票发行定价决策的影响。本文通过设计一个发股收益与控制权收益不可兼得的治理机制,可以把IPO盈余“过度包装”的融资行为内生化。

There are always excessive earnings management on IPO activity so long as the value of IPO issuers is exaggerated by outside investors and there is no related corporate governance mechanism. We analyze the effects of designing a Corporate Governance Mechanism on the pricing of equity financing in China stock market when the Chinese listed companies are faced with tradeoff among equity financing profits and equity holding profits and equity controlling profits. As a result, the design makes the behavior of excessive earnings management endogenous.