期权博弈的分类及其在不完全信息下的均衡策略研究

Classifying Option Games and Studying Their Equilibrium Strategies under Incomplete Information

期权博弈的分类与均衡策略研究是进行期权博弈模型研究,为企业在不同的竞争性投资实践中提供科学决策的基础与根本。首先从实物期权的种类和竞争特性出发对期权博弈进行了分类与界定。然后,在不完全信息条件下,重点研究了占优型实物期权博弈均衡策略。无论是在高成本或低成本类型下,占优型企业均会以低成本的身份选择最佳投资时机和最佳垄断产量进入市场生产、成为市场的领导者;在观察到领导者行动策略的基础上,追随者按实物期权方法的投资决策基本规则确定其进入市场的最佳投资时机;随后,领导者与追随者按照精炼贝耶斯纳什均衡产量进行生产,共同获得市场均衡收益。

It is the foundation of modeling option games and making the scientific decisions in the different investment environment to classify option games and investigate their equilibrium strategies. This article,firstly, has classified and defined the option games according to the types of the real option and the properties of competition. And then, under the condition of incomplete information, the equilibrium strategies in the privileged real option game have been specially investigated. In the end ,it is concluded that the privileged investors will select the optimal investment time and the optimal monopolized output in terms of the identity of the low cost to become the leader of the market whether they are the high cost enterprises or the low;on the basis of observing the leaders＇ strategies, the followers will select the optimal investment time into the market according to the basic principle of applying the real option method into the investment decision;subsequently, the leaders and the followers will yield in terms of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Output to get the equilibrium income together.