税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

Tax Competition, Region Game and Their Efficiency of Growth

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。

The reform of Chinese fiscal decentralization inspired the local governments＇ enthusiasm of developing the region＇s economy. But the unapt decentralization also intensifies the tax competition among regions. This paper analyzes the tax competition among provinces using a basic spatial lag econometric model. A negative reaction function slope indicates the presence of different tax competition strategies in the choices of local governments, and the preferences of some local governments for public goods are rather low. While the Granger causality test between tax competition and economic growth shows that the public expenditure makes a positive effect to economic growth, and the efforts of levy tax of local governments are adaptive behaviors to theirs fiscal status. Finally, the authors propose that the central government should construct a public expenditure equalization system of regions.