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低通货膨胀货币政策的动态不一致性及其缓解

Dynamic Disagreement of Monetary Policy for Low Inflation and Its Alleviation
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摘要 我国目前经济的发展处于高增长、低通胀状态,在实施低通货膨胀货币政策时可能会遇到动态不一致问题。声誉模型、授权模型和受限制的相机抉择策略是目前比较有效的几种缓解货币政策动态不一致问题的方法。为有效地将低通货膨胀货币政策实施到位,我们目前最好的策略是实行更加独立的货币政策,设计合理的委托代理激励合同。 The development of China＇ s economy at present is in a situation of high growth and low inflation. Dynamic disagreement problem arises when low inflation monetary policy is taking effect. Reputation pattern, authorization pattern and restricted random choice tactic are rather effective methods for alleviating dynamic disagreement problem. In order to effectively bring the low inflation monetary policy into effect, the best measure for us to take at present is a more independent monetary policy, and a reasonable consign-agent incentive contract.
作者 孙雯 李治国 孙先锋
机构地区 复旦大学管理学院 西安交通大学研究生院
出处 《河南金融管理干部学院学报》 2006年第4期48-53,共6页 Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres
关键词 货币政策 动态不一致性 声誉模型 授权模型 monetary policy Dynamic Disagreement reputation pattern authorization pattern
分类号 F822.0 [经济管理—财政学]
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参考文献11

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二级参考文献12

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共引文献15

河南金融管理干部学院学报
2006年 第4期

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