摘要
我国股市长期存在泡沫,造成外部股权融资行为住往净现值(NPV)大于0。这使一些劣质企业有强烈的融资圈钱动机。同时,一些上市公司的治理结构还不完善,控股股东容易侵占小投资者的利益。这些制度性特征可能造成募集资金使用不良。实证研究表明:融资规模越大、财务杠杆越低和再融资需求越小的企业,它的募集资金投入程度显著性越低。这说明上市公司的圈钱动机可能是募集资金使用的重要影响因素。
Due to the fact that most of the equity financing in China enjoys a positive net present value, lots of low quality firms have very strong incentives to go public. Moreover, the corporate governance of many listed companies in China is imperfect, and it is very common that the controlling shareholder expropriates minority shareholders. These institutional characteristics may lead to a bad utilization of IPO proceeds. Empirical results show that companies with more equity financing tend to invest less IPO proceeds. Leverage and refinancing demand also have a significant influence on the investment of IPO proceeds. These findings indicate that the utilization of IPO proceeds is motivated by the money encirclement incentive.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第8期107-111,共5页
Reform
关键词
IPO圈钱
募集资金
融资规模
再融资
IPO, money encirclement, raise capital, scale of financing, refinancing