皮尔士的“有方向的反基础主义”

Peirce's “Directional Anti-foundationism”

在认识论上,皮尔士是一个典型的反基础主义者。在皮尔士看来,在人类的认识过程中,并不存在绝对可靠的基础。所有的知识(包括科学知识在内)都是暂时的,都有可能也理应受到未来的批判或反驳。尽管如此,皮尔士依然承诺了最终的科学进步。因为在人类认识(尤其是科学研究)的过程中,通过科学方法的假说推理,研究者共同体最终会趋于一致,并且最终会向真理收敛。在其关于科学方法的论述和符号学的辩护模式中,我们找到了这种收敛的根基。在这种意义上,笔者称之为“有方向的反基础主义”。

In epistemology, Peirce is a typical anti-foundationalist. According to Peirce, there is not an absolutely secure basis for our knowledge during the course of our knowing. All of knowledge, including the scientific knowledge, is provisional, and they may and should be subject to the future criticism and objection. However, Peirce is committed to the final progress of science, because during the course of our knowing (especially the scientific inquiry), the community of investigators tends to final agreement and attains convergence towards truth in the long run by virtue of abduction. We can seek the ground of this kind of convergence in Peirce's discussing about scientific method and the semeiotic model of justification. And in this sense, I call it “directional anti-foundation