期刊文献+

三方互动:规范我国地方政府间竞争的思考 被引量:6

Interaction among Central Government,Local Government and Social Forces in Regulating Inter-jurisdictional Competition
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摘要 在我国当前的制度环境下,地方政府在竞争中可以采取4种策略:约束“掠夺之手”、减少公共品的供给、将危机转嫁给不具流动性的要素、树立壁垒干预市场。规范地方政府间竞争应当避免地方政府采用第3、4种策略。为限制地方政府树立壁垒干预市场,从中央层面来看,需要建立全国统一大市场,推行以公平为基础的政策、制度化中央与地方的权力分配;从地方层面来看,需要转变地方政府职能,加强地方公共财政建设,构建地方特色;从社会层面来看,为限制地方政府转嫁竞争危机,需要充分发挥居民在地方政府间竞争中的裁决作用,发挥民营经济的力量以及发挥第三部门的力量。 Under China's regulation circumstance,there are four s trategies for local governments to compete for mobile scare resources:restrict its own grabbing hand,reduce the provision of public goods and services,transfer the burden to immobile factors,or establish trade barriers and interfere in the market.To regulate competition among local governments,the third and the fourth strategies should be curbed by the joint effort of central government,local governments and social forces.In order to restrict local government' establishing trade barriers and interfering in the market,at the central government level,it is necessary to construct a big countrywide market in which strategies based on justice are carried out and the power distribution between central government and local government is institutionalized;at the local government level,it is essential to transit the function of local government,strengthen the construction of local public finance and set up local color;at the society level,it is important to emphasize on the residents' role of decision-making in competition among local governments and the power of private economy and the third sector to avoid local governments' transferring competition risks.
出处 《公共管理学报》 2006年第3期5-11,共7页 Journal of Public Management
基金 广东省哲学社会科学"十五"规划基金资助项目(05F-03)
关键词 地方政府间竞争 中央 地方 社会 Competition among Local Governments Central Government Local Government Social Forces
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参考文献16

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二级参考文献28

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引证文献6

二级引证文献12

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