国有控股、经营者晋升和公司绩效

State Holding, Promotion of Uppermost Decision - maker and Firm Performance

本文从终极控股角度,以国有控股上市公司为样本,研究经营者晋升的决定因素。研究发现:会计度量的公司绩效对经营者晋升的影响为正,随着经营者年龄、任期增加,晋升机会对公司绩效的敏感性下降;相对年度绩效,任期内平均绩效对晋升机会的影响更大,而相对于行业和前任经营者来说的相对绩效评价作用并不显著;政府的控股层数越多,晋升机会对绩效的敏感性越强,公司的中央或地方属性以及规模对晋升机会的影响不显著。

From the point of ultimate controlling, by using the data of listed - firm controlled by State to explore the determinants of promotion, we find that there is signifieant positive relationship between the aeeount - measured performanees and promotion. As the uppermost deeision- maker＇s age and tenure inereasing, the sensibility of promotion probability to firm performanee deelines, but when the number of tiers of State eontrolling inereasing, the sensibility inereases. Relative to annul performanee, the average tenure performanees have more effeet to promotion probability, but this effeet does not exist when we use industry - relative and predeeessor - relative performanees. Moreover, firm size and whether the listed - firm is eontrolled by eentral government or by loeal government have no effeet to promotion probability.