锦标赛、内生性制度创新供给与地区博弈——以各地物流园区布局为例

Championship, Supply of Endogenous Institutional Innovation and Regional Game——An Example of Distribution Park in China

本文通过构建一个两期的地方政府制度创新的博弈模型,分析得出地方政府边际制度创新的努力成本不仅取决于整个社会对制度创新的认可和接纳程度,而且还取决于锦标赛中胜负收益差。在中国目前能上不能下的刚性升迁制度下,出于自身未来政治生涯的考虑,远见型的政府官员要想获得相同的被提拔的可能,就必然比短视型的政府官员付出更多的努力。屡禁不止的重复建设热及物流园区热的背后的一个重要原因就是地方政府出于抬高锦标赛中对手成本的动机,同时又可将不能被中央政府观察或证实的因素以显性化的方式而得以被中央政府所证实,从而达到战胜对手的目的。

Based on a two-stage-game model, this article shows that the marginal costs of local government institutional innovations not only lie on the level of recognition and acceptance of the whole society to them, but also depend on the sum of the winners＇rewards during the tournament. Under the background of downgrade rigidity of political promotion tournament, the foresighted government officials who want to attain the same promotion opportunities with the shortsighted government officials have to make more efforts which can be observed by the central government. The true reason behind the rush to reconstruct and rebuild distribution parks is that the local government could not only add their rival＇s costs , but also present obviously to the central government their abilities unobserved and unverified by the latter in political promotion tournament.