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2个企业同时博弈的动态古诺模型 被引量:5

Dynamical Cournot model with duopoly's simultaneous-move game
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摘要 依据产品的市场容量随着时间发生变化的特点,修正了2个企业同时博弈的动态古诺模型,得到2个新的模型(模型Ⅰ和模型Ⅱ)及其各自所对应的产量解.其中,模型Ⅱ为具有有限理性的动态调整模型.针对这2个新模型,给出了阶段i时的市场容量与相应阶段的产量解之间的关系,以及对应于产量解的企业利润的计算公式.在此基础上,通过对产量解之间的比较与分析可得,模型Ⅰ和模型Ⅱ是对传统模型的进一步扩展,其阶段数m往往是在博弈过程中随着市场容量的变化而确定的,并且模型Ⅱ优于模型Ⅰ. Due to the property that the market capacity changes with respect to time, two modified dynamical Cournot models ( Model Ⅰ and Model Ⅱ ) with duopoly' s simultaneous-move game are established, and their solutions are presented respectively. In Model Ⅱ , the duopoly are finite rational firms, and their game is a dynamical Cournot adjustment process. Then, the relationship between the market capacity and the optimal solutions at stage i and the formulas of the firm profits corresponding to the solutions are provided. With the comparison and analysis of these models' solutions, it can be illustrated that Model Ⅰ and Model Ⅱ are extensions to the traditional one, the game stage number m is often determined by the change of market capacity, and Model Ⅱ is superior to Model Ⅰ.
作者 闫安 达庆利
出处 《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2006年第4期672-676,共5页 Journal of Southeast University:Natural Science Edition
基金 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20030286008)
关键词 博弈 古诺模型 寡头垄断市场 市场容量 game Cournot model oligopoly market market capacity
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参考文献12

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二级参考文献21

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