监管对现代商业银行决策的影响

The Impact of Regulation on Modern Commercial Bank's Decision

利用引入流动风险的Montin—Klein模型,分析当央行对存款保险及存贷款利率实行监管时,商业银行追求利润最大化的决策．当央行对存款保险进行监管时,存贷款利率随保险金上限增加而增加；当对存贷款利率实行监管时,商业银行根据不同的实际情况做出最优决策,惩罚利率及拆借利率都对其策略产生影响．由于发展中国家(包括中国)商业银行的管理成本过大及其他因素的影响,使得央行的监管往往达不到预期目的,商业银行也实施不了其最优策略,商业银行还必须作许多内部调整以适应国际大环境．这些分析给中国金融制度改革过程中央行对实行有效监管提供了一些理论依据．

By making use of Montin-Klein model induced liquidity risk, this paper analyses commercial bank＇s optimal strategy when central bank gives reserves and deposit and loan rates regulations. When the central bank imposes a regulation on reserves, the ceiling on the reserves decreases the loan and deposit rates. When regulating on the loan and deposit rate, the commercial bank will make optimal strategies in different cases. Both the penalty rate rp and interest rate r impact the strategy of the commercial bank. Because of the large management cost in many developing countries, the central bank usually can＇t obtain its object, and the commercial bank also can＇t realize its optimal strategy. The commercial bank must do some internal adjustment to adapt the international environment. With the Chinese financial reform, these analyses propose some useful advices for the central bank to increase the efficiency of regulatory policies.