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On the Semivalues and the Least Square Values Average Per Capita Formulas and Relationships

On the Semivalues and the Least Square Values Average Per Capita Formulas and Relationships
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摘要 In this paper, it is shown that both the Semivalues and the Least Square Values of cooperative transferable utilities games can be expressed in terms of n^2 averages of values of the characteristic function of the game, by means of what we call the Average per capita formulas. Moreover, like the case of the Shapley value earlier considered, the terms of the formulas can be computed in parallel, and an algorithm is derived. From these results, it follows that each of the two values mentioned above are Shapley values of games easily obtained from the given game, and this fact gives another computational opportunity, as soon as the computation of the Shapley value is efficiently done. In this paper, it is shown that both the Semivalues and the Least Square Values of cooperative transferable utilities games can be expressed in terms of n^2 averages of values of the characteristic function of the game, by means of what we call the Average per capita formulas. Moreover, like the case of the Shapley value earlier considered, the terms of the formulas can be computed in parallel, and an algorithm is derived. From these results, it follows that each of the two values mentioned above are Shapley values of games easily obtained from the given game, and this fact gives another computational opportunity, as soon as the computation of the Shapley value is efficiently done.
作者 Irinel DRAGAN
机构地区 University of Texas
出处 《Acta Mathematica Sinica,English Series》 SCIE CSCD 2006年第5期1539-1548,共10页 数学学报(英文版)
关键词 Shapley value Semivalues Least Square Values Average per capita formulas Banzhaf value Shapley value, Semivalues, Least Square Values, Average per capita formulas, Banzhaf value
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参考文献14

  • 1Dragan, I.: The Average per capita formula for the Shapley value. Libertas Mathematica, 12, 139-146(1992)
  • 2Dragan, I., Driesen, T., Funaki, Y.: Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games. OR Spektrum, 18, 97-105 (1996)
  • 3Dubey, P., Neyman, A., Weber, R. J.: Value theory without efficiency. Math. O. R., 6, 122-128 (1981)
  • 4Keane, M.: Some topics in N-person Game Theory, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1969,Evanston, Illinois
  • 5Ruiz, L., Valenciano, F., Zarzuelo, J. M.: The family of the Least Square Values for transferable utility games. GEB, 24, 109-130 (1998)
  • 6Dragan, I.: The potential basis and the Weighted Shapley value. Liber~as Mathematica, 11, 139-150 (1991)
  • 7Dragan, I.: On the inverse problem for Semivalues of cooperative TU games. International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 22(4), 545-561(2005)
  • 8Shapley, L. S.: A value for N-person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.), Annals of Math. Study No. 28, Princeton University Press, 307-317, 1953
  • 9Banzhaf, J. F.: III, Weighted voting doesn,t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review, 19,317-343 (1965)
  • 10Dragan, I.: Potential, balanced contributions, recursion formula, Shapley blueprint properties for values of cooperative TU games, in Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice, Harrie de Swart (ed.), 1999, Tilburg Univ. Press, 57-67

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