共谋行为在政府采购中的表现及对策分析

Analysis on the Collusion in the Government Procurement

共谋行为是委托代理问题中的一个重要组成部分,由于信息不对称、多层代理和权力的存在,使政府采购过程中有着共谋行为滋生的可能,并且广泛地表现在采购官员与财政部门、供应商、各级政府机关和监督主体之间的合作博弈中。其结果是增加了政府采购的交易成本,违背了政府采购的初衷。

Collusion is an important part of principal agent. It is possible that asymmetric information, multi-agent and power lie in government procurement, which embody in the cooperative games of purchasing official, the department of finance, suppliers and supervisors. Consequence of collusions increase transaction costs of government procurement and deviate original intention of government procurement .