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形式模型与国际关系研究 被引量:5

Formal Models and International Studies
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摘要 本文讨论了形式模型在国际关系中的应用,认为形式模型对国际关系研究能够产生助益,这主要体现在:通过明晰理论假设,使人们对结论的适用范围有清楚的认识;使研究人员能够对研究对象中涉及的机制进行清晰可靠的分析;通过模型序列,促进知识的积累;避免研究过程中的反复重新论证等等。在此基础上,本文沿着理性选择、集体选择和博弈论的发展线索对形式模型在国际关系领域的应用进行了讨论。 This article discusses the application of formal models in International Relations, and argues that international studies can benefit from using formal models, this embodies the following aspects: Through clarification of theoretical assumptions, formal models help researchers get a better understanding of the application sphere of theoretical conclusions. They can also help researchers make clear and reliable analysis upon the related mechanisms. Accumulation of knowledge can be achieved through series of models. Repetition in the processing of reasoning can be avoid largely through the application of formal models. This article also discusses the application of formal models in International Relations through a developing direction of rational choice, collective choice and game theory.
作者 周方银
出处 《外交评论(外交学院学报)》 CSSCI 2006年第4期93-100,共8页 Foreign Affairs Review
关键词 形式模型 国际关系 理性选择 博弈论 Formal models International Relations Rational Choice Game Theory
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参考文献35

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共引文献294

同被引文献71

  • 1闵剑.对当前国际警务合作方式的探讨[J].公安理论与实践(上海公安高等专科学校学报),2005,15(1):93-96. 被引量:20
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