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货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起 被引量:92

The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and The Flourishing of Central Bank Transparency
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摘要 本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。 This paper explores the effect of central bank transparency on the effectiveness of monetary policy, and shows that one key factor behind the move to increase transparency on the part of central banks is the relationship between transparency and the effectiveness of monetary policy. According to the theory of "time inconsistency", transparency in monetary policy has nothing to do with the effectiveness of monetary policy because public has perfect knowledge about economy. But when the private sector faces uncertainty about the economy, the central bank transparency plays a crucial role in stabilizing and guiding the agents' learning process and expectations, and then improves the effectiveness of monetary policy greatly.
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第8期24-34,共11页 Economic Research Journal
关键词 不完全认知 公众预期 预期引导 货币政策透明性 货币政策有效性 Imperfect Knowledge Expectations Expectation Guiding Transparency in Monetary Policy Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
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参考文献32

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二级参考文献16

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