摘要
通过构建我国中央与地方林业投资的博弈模型,深入分析中央和地方两类利益主体所处的纳什均衡状态,借以探讨在“天然林保护工程”实施中地方林业配套资金难以落实的问题,并查找原因,提出建议,必将有利于实施六大林业重点工程,理顺林业资金筹集渠道,为实施我国林业可持续发展战略提供可靠、稳定的资金保障。
Through setting up the game theory model of foresty investment between the central and the local, the paper deeply analyzes two kinds of interset subject in Nash - equilibrium. Using these theories,we discuss the problem of local quota finacing which always is difficult to fialfill in the "Tian Bao" project, and find some reasons, put forward some advices.
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2006年第5期15-17,51,共4页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
关键词
林业
投资
利益
博弈
forestry
investment
interest
game