我国中央与地方政府林业投资的博弈分析──以“天保工程”地方林业配套资金的落实为例

The Analysis of Game about Forestry Investment between Central Government and Local Government in China——According to Local Quota Financing Fulfillment of "Tian Bao"Projct

通过构建我国中央与地方林业投资的博弈模型,深入分析中央和地方两类利益主体所处的纳什均衡状态,借以探讨在“天然林保护工程”实施中地方林业配套资金难以落实的问题,并查找原因,提出建议,必将有利于实施六大林业重点工程,理顺林业资金筹集渠道,为实施我国林业可持续发展战略提供可靠、稳定的资金保障。

Through setting up the game theory model of foresty investment between the central and the local, the paper deeply analyzes two kinds of interset subject in Nash - equilibrium. Using these theories,we discuss the problem of local quota finacing which always is difficult to fialfill in the ＂Tian Bao＂ project, and find some reasons, put forward some advices.