股票期权驱动下的企业财务欺诈的研究

Research on Financial Fraud Driven by Stock Options

股票期权的推广运用,在美国20世纪90年代经济的持续高速发展中功不可没。在多数情况下,这种激励机制通过让高管人员分享剩余收益,能够有机地协调经营者与所有者之间的利益关系,激励高管人员创造优异的业绩。然而,在承认股票期权激励先进性的同时,也必须正视股票期权潜在的负面影响,即股票期权可以因所有者缺位、经营者篡位而成为企业管理者进行财务欺诈的工具。笔者尝试性地探讨了股票期权与财务欺诈之间的关系,在此基础上提出了完善我国股票期权制度,以防范财务欺诈的具体建议。

The popularized applications of stock options play a key role in the continuous boom of American economy in 1990s. In general, this incentive mechanism can harmonize the relationship of interest between managers and shareholders and inspire managers to perform better by sharing residual incomes. However, the potential negative effect has to be confronted with while acknowledging the advance of stock options. Managers may use it as a tool to fraud because of the absence of shareholders or manager＇s authority exceeding. The relation between stock options and fraud is discussed. Some particular suggestions are presented for improving Chinese stock options mechanism and preventing fraud.