摘要
国有产权改革目前正进入攻坚阶段,各种利用控制权地位侵占国有资产的案例比比皆是。本文通过LLSV模型分析了大股东侵占发生的条件机理和动因,探究了如何防范和减缓侵占行为的均衡条件,提出了在国有产权改革实践中如何对待此种行为的政策建议。
The reform of national property rights has now been coming into the difficult phase and diversified cases of the controlling shareholder' s misappropriating behavior can be found everywhere. Firstly, the mechanism and motivation of the controlling shareholder' s misappropriating behavior is analyzed by the LLSV model, then the equilibrium conditions are investigated, by the end of this paper, some policy suggestions of national property rights reformation are provided forward.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第16期21-25,共5页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
2005年国家社科基金项目(编号:05BJY003)
教育部哲科创新基地南京大学经济转型与发展子项"行为金融学及复杂经济系统演化"项目
关键词
控股股东
侵占
国有产权改革
controlling shareholder
misappropriating
national property rights reformation