我国土地征收制度的博弈路径选择分析

ANALYSES ABOUT LAND EXPROPRIATION SYSTEM WITH GAME ROUTE SELECTION

本文分析地方政府和被征地农民、地方政府之间以及地方政府和上级政府间在土地征收上的三层博弈关系,探讨土地征收博弈过程中农民、地方政府、上级政府间的利益关系和由此产生的行为选择以及能否取得多赢的可能性,为我国土地征收制度改革方向选择提供理论依据。我国现行土地征收制度存在诸多弊端,使博弈主体在各自行为上非理性选择。我国土地征收制度改革应该向达到理想纳什均衡的方向推进,使得地方政府违法征地得到的好处变少,地方政府依法征地得到的好处变大;违法征地引起冲突的惩罚成本于地方政府变大,于农民变少;合法征地因被征地农民抵制引发强制执行的成本于政府变少,于农民变大;中央政府要保持强大的威慑力,提高发现和监管地方政府违法用地的能力,加大地方政府违法用地惩罚代价。

Exampled by some university towns, considering the game relationships between the local government and peasantry whose land is expropriated, between the local governments, and between the local and superior governments, this paper discusses the interest relationship among the peasantry, local governments and superior governments; it also infers the corresponding action choice and the all-benefit possibility. By using the complete information static and dynamic game model, and the incomplete information static game, the game mode of Chinese land expropriation is discussed in this paper as well. Finally, the reform direction to optimize the ongoing expropriation system is put forward.