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风险企业的控制权配置研究 被引量:2

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摘要 风险投资的不确定性和信息不对称性,使得风险企业中的控制权配置成为影响企业成败的重要问题。本文在现有风险企业控制权研究的基础上,针对其不足之处,引入控制权连续变量,对风险投资家与风险企业家的控制权分配,以及影响风险企业中控制权配置的重要因素进行分析,是对风险企业治理机制的一次有益探讨。
作者 刘萍萍
出处 《西北工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2006年第2期60-63,83,共5页 Journal of Northwestern Polytechnical University(Social Sciences)
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