多任务委托工程监理激励机制设计

An Designs of Incentive System of Engineering Supervision of Multi-task Principal

工程监理制度下的业主与工程监理之间的关系属于多任务的委托-代理关系。根据多任务委托-代理博弈分析,由于工程监理承担任务间努力成本的替代性,多任务委托-代理情况下的工程监理具有不同于单一任务委托-代理情况下的激励机制;为防止对工程监理激励效能的弱化,工程监理激励报酬制度应以客观绩效评价为主,并辅以主观绩效评价机制。

Under the engineering institution, the relationship between employers and engineering supervisors is multi - task principal - agent. According to multi - task principal- agent model, the multi - task principal - agent of engineering supervision is analysized in this thesis. The conclusion shows that the incentive system of engineering supervision in multi - task principal - a- gent is different from the one in the single - task, and the level of job being observed and the relationship of cost between two jobs are critical in the incentive. In order to prevent the weakened incentive in engineering supervision, the influence of the two factors mentioned above must be taken full consideration in establishing incentive system.