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国有企业会计信息失真的委托代理分析 被引量:1

Principal-agency Analysis of Accounting Information Distortion in the State-owned Enterprise
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摘要 国有企业的会计信息失真绝大部分可归结为代理问题,即企业代理人侵害委托人权益或欺骗委托人的问题。国有企业的根本问题在于所有者缺位,没有真正委托人参与博弈,再好的制度也会失灵。因此,治理会计信息失真的关键在于国有企业的战略性调整,即通过国有企业民营化使企业产生真正的所有者,在此基础上,再构筑各种激励约束机制。 The accounting information distortion of the state-owned enterprise could mostly be summed up the agency problem, that means the business agent has encroached on the rights and interests of the client or cheated the client.The basic problem of the state-owned enterprise is that the owner is vacant. There is no real client who participates the competition,and the system doesn't work. So the key point of solving accounting information distortion is carrying out strategy addjustment in the state-owned enterprise, that is to make the state-owned enterprise be private,then build all kinds of incentive and constraint mechanism based on it.
作者 李兰
机构地区 湖北省沙市中学
出处 《科技创业月刊》 2006年第9期53-54,共2页 Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology
关键词 国有企业 会计信息失真 代理问题 激励约束机制 the state-owned enterprise, accounting information distortion, agency problem, incentive and constraint mechanism
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