摘要
上市公司发行股票筹集的资金总是被大股东无偿侵占,这是大股东主要通过会计程序寻租的结果。在一定假设前提下,“股权融资—利益输送—会计寻租”模型揭示了大股东在上市公司不创造利润情况下,在股权融资过程中利益输送和会计寻租的一般规律,这为研究和制定相关政策提供了系统思路。
Raised fund of a Listed Companies is often freely seized by the largest Shareholder, because of the accounting rent --seeing application of the largest shareholder. This paper sets up a model of equity offerings, tunneling and accounting rent --seeking " based on certain assumption, and discovers the rules of benefit tunneling and accounting rent--seeking in the process of Equity Offerings without creating revenue of the Listed Company. Therefore, this paper paves the way of systematic thoughts in studying and making related policy.
出处
《五邑大学学报(社会科学版)》
2006年第3期61-65,共5页
Journal of Wuyi University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
股权融资
利益输送
会计寻祖
Equity Offerings
Tunneling
Accounting rent--seeking