现有银行产权制度下的不良资产生成机制

The Formation of Nonperforming Loans under the Property Right System of Banks

在目前银行改革的背景下,银行的不良资产仍然是阻碍银行发展的重大问题。本文分别在对称信息和不对称信息的前提下,通过建立两阶段的动态博弈模型,用激励相容约束机制,阐明国有银行不良资产之所以仍然不断涌现,是由于政府对银行产权份额的过多持有,激励不够充分而导致的。在此基础上,提出目前银行改革的主要问题和相应的政策建议。

Against the background of the bank reform, the tremendous NPL problem of the state - owned banks is still a big headache which blocks the development of the banks. By estabhshing a two - staged dynamic game model, this paper analyzes that the non- performing assets of the state- owned commercial bank are created mainly because of the game strategies between the govemment and the state - owned commercial bank to maximize their respective interest. On that analytical basis, the paper sets forth the present problems of the reform and some relative suggestions.