摘要
从博弈分析的角度来看,转型期中国民间资本进入银行业是多方博弈的结果,其制度变迁过程可以看成是国家与民间资本之间的博弈过程,变迁的路径就是博弈均衡解的轨迹。本文通过建立该制度变迁的动态匹配博弈模型,实证地分析这种制度是如何被博弈出来的,详细阐述该制度变迁的历史路径与路径特征,并提出相应政策建议。
From the angle of game research, the institution of Chinese private capital entering domestic banking is the result of many factors, especially the game between government regulations and private capitals. The institutional transition route can be regarded as the track of equilibrium solutions of game. This paper first establishes the quantitative analysis model of " dynamic matching and bargaining game," then analyzes how this game got its result with cases and expounds details of its change's historical route and route characters.
出处
《四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第5期77-83,共7页
Journal of Sichuan University:Philosophy and Social Science Edition
关键词
中国民间资本
银行业
制度变迁路径
动态匹配博弈模型
Chinese private capital, domestic banking, institutional transition route, dynamic matching game model