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企业理论的两种进路:在批判中超越 被引量:3

Two Approaches of Enterprise Theory:Transcendence in Animadversion
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摘要 新制度学派企业理论和马克思企业理论各有不同的理论进路。前者的预设前提、论证过程和理论目的存在严重缺陷;后者虽提供了客观认识现实的方法论指导,但其论证有待深化,结论有待扬弃。资本与劳动间非对称的产权关系和产权结构的不同特点以及由此所决定的二者不同的市场权力地位,是当前资本逻辑形成的原因。构建和谐企业理论的关键是要在企业的双重属性前提下超越“雇佣”的认识局限,走出“剥削”的历史阴影。 The enterprise theory of New Institutional Economics and that of Marxism have different theoretical approaches. The precondition, argumentation and theoretical purpose of the former have serious defect ; though the latter offers a methodological guidance for objectively understanding the real life, its reasoning needs to be deepened and its conclusion needs to be developed and discarded. The unsymmetrical ownership relationship between capital and labor, the different characteristics in property right structure, and the different market power and status which are determined by them are the main reasons why the capital logic is formed currently. The key to construct a harmonious enterprise theory is to transcend the limit of "employment" and walk out of the historical shadow of "exploitation" in the precondition of double attributes of enterprises.
作者 王海杰
机构地区 郑州大学商学院
出处 《经济经纬》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第5期98-101,共4页 Economic Survey
关键词 资本逻辑 产权关系 超越 capital logic property right relation transcendence
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参考文献5

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