我国旅行社业挂靠经营现象的市场监管博弈分析

An Analysis of the Market Regulation Game of Affiliating Operation in China's Travel Agency Industry

我国旅行社行业的挂靠经营现象屡禁不止,成为危害旅行社经营环境和损害旅游者合法权益的一大顽症。本文从博弈论的角度出发,建立起挂靠经营现象博弈模型和挂靠经营监管博弈模型,并运用这些模型对旅行社和挂靠者在挂靠经营合作中的策略选择、政府部门与旅行社及其合作伙伴的期望收益、旅游市场监管效果等进行了深入的分析,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。

The affiliating operation phenomenon in China＇ s travel industry is an issue that still exists though prohibited by the government. It actually has become a persistent tumor that hazards the operation environment of travel agencies and violates the legal rights and interest of tourists. By applying the game theory, the author established an affihating operation control model and made an in-depth analysis of the expected earnings of governmental departments, travel agencies and their p,artners, and the effect of market regulation as well. It also suggested some policies.