分销商信息私有时的库存合作契约设计

Contract designing in the supply chain under demand asymmetry

针对一个由一个供应商和一个分销商组成的二级供应链系统,当系统面对单品种的随机性外部需求时,首先分析了供应链不合作状态以及供应链联合最优状态下的成员的不同成本水平,并研究了信息对称情况下的合作契约;然后在分销商的存储费为不对称信息的情况下,分析了上述契约的局限性,并运用激励理论,提出激励供应链成员诚实申报信息的契约,实现了供应链系统的联合最优化.

Asymmetric information is widely seen in supply chain systems, and is the most difficult in cooperative contract design. In a cooperative 2-echelon serial supply chain system with stochastic demand, supply chain partners, i.e. suppliers and retailers, are all selfish cost-minimizing firms, so the optimal cooperative contract that aims to diminish the incentives which may derivate from the system optimal strategy is proposed. When the retailer＇s holding cost is private information, this contract is proved to be invalid and a new information revelation contract is then proposed by using principle/ agency theory.