期刊文献+

理解宪法:几种宪政经济学视野下的宪法观、复合宪法观与宪政的建立和巩固 被引量:1

On the Several Conceptions about the Constitution and the Building and Consolidation of Constitutional Regime from the View of Constitutional Regime Economics
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摘要 宪法之维系和宪政之建立与巩固,有赖于对宪法的复合式理解。宪法的内容构成、属性、层次以及宪政之建立与巩固过程,都是多元化的。宪政经济学视野下的契约宪法观、协作装置宪法观、惯例宪法观与自发生成的制度宪法观都把宪法简单化与单一化,因而无法解释宪法运行过程中的一些现象,也无法说明宪法是如何维系与宪政是如何建立与巩固的。要建立和巩固一个宪政体制,宪法的制定必须与某一共同体的惯例保持一致,同时,宪法必须具备稳定性、有效性和效率性。 The maintenance of constitution, the construction and consolidation of it depend on a comprehensive constitutional understanding. The contents, attributes, and levels of constitution as well as the process of the constitutional design and consolidation, are many-faceted. Those constitutional understandings as contract, convention, coordination devices, and spontaneously arisen institutions, all simplify constitution, and this simplifying makes it unable to explain some phenomena in the process of constitutional operation and how constitutional regime is created and consolidated. To build and consolidate a constitutional regime, the making of constitution should conform with conventions of a community. Simultaneously, constitution should be stable, functional and effective.
作者 欧阳景根
出处 《晋阳学刊》 北大核心 2006年第5期29-36,共8页 Academic Journal of Jinyang
关键词 契约 协作装置 惯例 自发生成的制度 复合宪法观 contract coordination devices conventions spontaneously arisen institutions comprehensive understanding of constitution
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参考文献17

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