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多元化经营与公司价值——来自我国上市公司的经验证据 被引量:7

Diversification and Firm Value: An Empirical Evidence Based on China's Stock-market Listed Companies
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摘要 中国上市公司普遍实施多元化战略.但对其经济后果存在较大的争议。通过454家公司2001~2003年度多元化程度与公司价值的多元回归分析,我们发现:第一大股东为法人的上市公司。存在显著的多元化折价;第一大股东为国家的上市公司。多元化程度与公司价值没有显著关系。该结果支持代理理论.即在多元化经营方面.法人大股东相比国家大股东有更高的代理成本.另外.也说明多元化本身是中性的。 Stock-market listed companies in China put diversification in practice widely. But scholars debate warmly about its economic results. This paper examines the relationship between unrelated diversification and firm value using date from 454 public companies in the period of 2001-2003 by multiregression. No significant correlation between them is found in companies which state as first shareholders, but there is significant diversification discount in companies whose legal person as the first shareholder. The result can back agency theory, namely there is higher agency cost in companies whose legal person as first shareholder in diversified economy. On the other hand, the result indicates that the influence of diversification depends on a certain condition.
作者 金天 余鹏翼
出处 《佛山科学技术学院学报(社会科学版)》 2006年第4期65-70,共6页 Journal of Foshan University(Social Science Edition)
关键词 多元化经营 公司价值 上市公司 代理成本 diversification firm value stock-market listed companies agency cost
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参考文献6

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二级参考文献48

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