摘要
指出产学研合作中机会主义的根源在于产学研合作中信息的不完全与不对称、合约的不完备以及机会主义行为难以通过正式的司法程序进行证实。建立了一个单阶段博弈模型和引入附加参与人的重复博弈模型,在此基础上提出了治理产学研合作中的机会主义行为的对策。
The paper firstly analyses the causes of opportunism "industry-university-institute" cooperation. One is incompletion and asymmetry of information, the other is incompletion of the contract, another is that opportunism in "industry-university-institute" cooperation has difficulties in conforming through the courts. In addition, one-stage game model and a repeated game were established. On the basis of the models, countermeasures for opportunism in "industry-university-institute" were put forward.
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期38-41,共4页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371070)
上海市重点学科建设资助项目(TD502)
关键词
产学研合作
机会主义
重复博弈
治理
"industry-university-institute" cooperation
opportunism
repeated game
governance