股权结构、代理问题与公司多元化折价被引量：25

Equity Structure, Agency and Corporate Diversification Discounts

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摘要本文利用我国最新的上市公司资料,在得出我国上市多元化公司存在折价的基础上,从股权结构的角度来验证了代理问题和公司多元化折价的关系。我们发现,国有股权与公司多元化程度呈现负相关关系,法人股与多元化程度呈倒U形曲线关系,流通股与多元化程度呈正比例关系;股权集中度、机构持股比例和管理层持股与多元化程度呈负相关关系。结果表明,代理问题在有效解释公司多元化程度的同时,也有效地解释了公司多元化折价的产生。 This paper tests the relationship between agency and corporate diversification discounts from equity structure with latest data. We find that state-owned equity is negatively related to corporate diversification, that corporate equity is related to diversification in inversed “U” pattern, that tradable equity is negatively related to diversification, that equity concentration, institution equity percentage and management equity percentage are negatively related to diversification. The results show that agency can effectively interpret corporate diversification discounts.

作者韩忠雪朱荣林王宁

机构地区上海交通大学管理学院

出处《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第5期52-58,共7页 Modern Economic Science

关键词公司多元化折价代理问题上市公司 Corporate diversification Discounts Agency Listed companies

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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