单边开放电力市场中长期合同的谈判博弈模型

The Bargain Game Model of Long-term Contract in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market

合同交易是电力市场的重要交易方式之一。在单边开放电力市场中,针对谈判型长期合同,构建了发电公司与交易中心的序贯不完全信息讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,认为合同能否达成主要取决于交易中心对发电公司单位发电成本的估计。最后提出设计有效的实时电力市场竞价机制,鼓励发电公司揭露其真实成本,有利于电力长期合同的达成,从而提高整个电力市场的效率。

In electricity market, long-term contract is one of the important means of transaction. With the negotiation means of certain capacity and uncertain price, this paper constructs the bargaining game model in Unilateral Opening Electricity Market. In the model, there are incomplete information and alternating offers between power generation company and transaction center. Through solving the model and analyzing the conclusions, it believes that, whether the two bargainers can reach the bargain lies on the transaction center＇s estimation on generation cost. At last, the pa- per proposes that we should design the effective auction mechanism for power spot market, which will encourage the power generation company to reveal its true costs, thus to facilitate the transaction of long-term contract, and to improve the efficiency of the whole electricity market.