建设项目设计方激励机制分析

Analysis of Incentive Mechanism for Designer in Construction Projects

分析我国的工程项目设计阶段主要存在问题,指出产生这些问题的根本原因是设计过程的信息不对称和缺乏监督制约机制.利用委托代理理论,分析了设计方在对称信息和不对称信息下的行为,得出在信息不对称的情况下,设计师的努力水平会降低,同时产生一定的代理成本.根据分析过程,指出了业主应选择信誉较好、实力较强的设计方;对设计方采用激励合同并引入监督机制;将设计前期工作深入细致做好等方法来有效提高设计方努力水平和降低代理成本.

The problems are analyzed during the engineering design stage of construction project in China. The reasons are pointed out, which are the asymmetric information and the lack of supervisor. The P-A theory is introduced to analyze the behavior under symmetry and asymmetry conditions. It is concluded that the effort level will be lower under asymmetry conditions and agency cost will rise. The advice is that the excellent designer should be chosen, the incentive bargain should be adopted and the supervision should be introduced so that the asymmetry conditions may be mitigated and the effort degree can be raised.