非均衡性旅游地空间竞争中搭便车问题研究

Game Theory Application on Free Riding in Non-Equilibrium Spatial Competition of Tourism Destinations

客源市场的公有性以及景区产权界定不清,加之市场进入成本较低、机会主义等因素导致旅游地空间竞争中的搭便车行为,搭客源市场便车是主要类型之一。信息不完整、虚假广告与推销、低价竞争、游客心理的变化是客源市场搭便车行为的特殊原因。概述搭便车的几种应用理论,并构建二阶博弈模型来研究非均衡性竞争中关于客源市场的搭便车行为,研究发现:在非均衡性竞争中,搭便车行为因资源禀赋的差异而表现不同,资源异质性程度越高,越容易发生搭便车现象。同时,资源同质性竞争容易形成区域空间形态的单核结构,而资源异质性竞争更容易形成区域空间形态的双核或多核结构。

The free riding in the spatial competition of tourism destinations exists due to the public ownership of tourism market, indefinite ownership of tourism attractions,opportunistic actions of stakeholders and low barriers of market entry and so on. Free riding in destination marketing is mostly observed. Specially, information insufficiency, false advertisements and marketing, low - price competition, shifting preferences of tourists are the factors contributing to free riding in the competition over tourist market. Several applied theories concerning free riding are taken into account and a theoretical model based on game theory is formulated to study the free tiding behavior in the non - equilibrium spatial competition over tourist market. The findings suggest that free riding behavior changes according to tourism resources, the more these resources are heterogeneous, the more often free riding occurs. And spatial competition over homogeneous resources often results in a mono- nuclear spatial structure of tourism destinations, while that over heterogeneous resources often leads to the formation of a bi - or multi - nuclear structure.