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我国公司治理问题的实质及其政策含义 被引量:1

The Essence and Policy Significance of Company Administration in China
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摘要 本文认为我国公司治理问题的实质主要是大股东与少数股东的利益冲突,而且由于政府常常身兼大股东的角色,所以这后一种冲突还表现为政府多重职能引发的冲突。把握这一点对于理解政府在我国公司治理中的作用以及作为我国现阶段公共政策一部分的国有股减持的途径和方式具有重要意义。 The paper claims that the essence of company administration in China is mainly the interest conflict between big shareholders and a few shareholders; furthermore, since governments often simultaneously play a role as big shareholders, the conflict also results from the multifunction of governments. Grasping the essence is of great significance to understand the role of governments in company administration in China as well as the means of the reduction of state - owned shares as part of public policies in present China.
作者 陈建波
出处 《江苏社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第5期44-49,共6页 Jiangsu Social Sciences
关键词 公司治理问题 政府 国有股减持 company administration government the reduction of state - owned shares
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参考文献17

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