网络竞争:结构-行为-绩效

Network Competition: A Structure-conduct-performance Approach

电信业竞争性改革过程一般要经历垄断市场—转型市场—寡头市场等阶段。在不同阶段和市场结构下,市场势力和企业行为将存在显著差异,这意味着需要不同的监管重点和措施。借助于“结构—行为—绩效”(SCP)分析,本文得出如下结论:(1)对于享有高市场势力的网络垄断者,进入阻挠将成为监管焦点;(2)在市场转型期,需要防止主导运营商利用其瓶颈和成本优势削弱竞争,可能的监管措施包括强制互联、非捆绑甚至结构分离等;(3)寡头之间面临在零售市场竞争和在批发市场合作的局面,其市场势力取决于它们之间的竞争程度,可能的合谋行动将成为竞争监管的重点。

The process of competition reform in telecommunications typically starts with a monopoly market, then followed by a transitional one, and eventually ends at an oligopoly, during which substantially changes in terms of market power and business conduct can happen; and this implies different regulatory emphasis and instruments for different stages. Based on the classic SCP model, this paper provides a systemic discussion on this subject. Conclusions are drawn that： （1） for a monopoly with substantial market power, regulatory focus should be on entry deterrence;（2） when the market is in transition, the dominant firm may use its possession of bottleneck facilities and cost advantage to prevent entry while regulatory in- struments may include mandatory interconnection, unbundling, and even structural separation; （3） oligopolists＇ market power is contingent upon the degree of rivalry among the players, and collusion should therefore be brought to regulator＇s primary attention in this market.