保险市场的信息不对称及其规避策略研究

Research on the Asymmetric Information and Its Risk-averse Strategies in the Insurance

对描述保险市场的两类不对称信息———逆向选择和道德风险进行了研究。阐述了道德风险与逆向选择的概念及其产生机理,并从一般意义上给出了逆向选择与道德风险的规避策略。在此基础上,阐述了不对称信息条件下最优保险契约设计的基本思想。

In this paper, two main models under the circumstance of asymmetric information in the insurance market-the adverse selection and moral hazard were studied. Firstly, the concepts and creation mechanisms of adverse selection and moral hazard were explained, and then how to avoid them generally was discussed. Thereafter the idea of optimal insurance contract design under the circumstance of asymmetric information was elaborated.