摘要
The correspondence of an external object to the category of a descriptive statement requires a reflexive-identity of the object, and such a reflexive-identity is primarily based on the cognition of spatiality. Spatiality is, however, constituted through visual perception. There are only two occasions on which definitive reflexive-identity is exemplified: the infinitesimal point and the infinite One, and others are just human stipulations that meet pragmatic needs of rough identification of things at hand. This paper analyzes the following reasons: (1) why visual perception is the primary basis of the constitution of reflexive-identity by detailed thought experiments and logical inferences; (2) how vision-centrality is determined by the basic structure of our perceptual mechanism.
The correspondence of an external object to the category of a descriptive statement requires a reflexive-identity of the object, and such a reflexive-identity is primarily based on the cognition of spatiality. Spatiality is, however, constituted through visual perception. There are only two occasions on which definitive reflexive-identity is exemplified: the infinitesimal point and the infinite One, and others are just human stipulations that meet pragmatic needs of rough identification of things at hand. This paper analyzes the following reasons: (1) why visual perception is the primary basis of the constitution of reflexive-identity by detailed thought experiments and logical inferences; (2) how vision-centrality is determined by the basic structure of our perceptual mechanism.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期74-78,共5页
Philosophical Research
基金
教育部规划项目资助
项目编号为01JA720010。
