经理交替模型与我国国有企业治理模式分析

Overlapping Generation Model and Corporate Governance Mechanism of the State-Own Enterprises in China

我国国有企业的产权特征和管理特征与日、德两国的公司有类似的地方,国有企业拥有实现“共同治理”的产权和管理基础。文章借助“经理交替模型”,证明在共同治理模式下,我国国有企业治理特征有可能有效地限制经理人员的寻租行为,但由于存在“新老三会”两套权力系统的冲突问题,使得企业内存在“强势经理”,其寻租行为会导致企业治理问题的恶化。

Having the characters of corporate property right and administration, Chinese stateowned enterprises （SOE） are similar to Japanese and German enterprises. Thus, Chinese SOEs could implement the mutual governance. It was proved using overlapping generation model that rent-seeking of the managers would be limited well by the mutual governance. There being the conflict between the two control systems in Chinese SOEs, dominant managers in the enterprises could deteriorate the mutual governance.