摘要
集群网络中的社会机制不能自动实现交易成本的节约。为解释集群网络的治理优势,通过构建中间人模型,对中间人的参与对交易机会、逆选择和资产专用性投资引起的机会主义等基本经济问题探讨,并且对集群网络作为交易中间人的信息结构特征和作用机制的分析,可以看出,集群网络的治理优势来源于对交易提供的产品质量鉴证和对资产专用性投资提供了合意的收益分配机制。
The social mechanism in cluster networks cannot save transaction costs by itself. In exploring the advantages of cluster networks governance, an intermediator model is built to analyze how the principal problems of exchange chances, adverse selections and opportunism resulting from special assets investment are solved. Then analyses are made of the characteristics of information structures and function mechanism with clusters networks as the intermediator of transaction. Finally, a conclusion is reached that governance advantages of cluster networks actually come from the quality certification of products and optimal revenues distribution mechanisms for special assets investment.
出处
《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期150-155,共6页
Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
集群网络
治理优势
中间人
模型
cluster networks
governance advantages
intennediator
model