期刊文献+

Korean Nuclear Crisis Management Versus China's Diplomatic Options

Korean Nuclear Crisis Management Versus China's Diplomatic Options
下载PDF
导出
摘要 Active Participation in the international management of the second Korean nuclear crisis represents a milestone in New China's diplomatic record -- a departure from a hands-off principle toward international controversies observed for more than half a century with few occasions of meddling in external tangles on its own initiative. Even more so was the case since the country launched the reform and open- ing-up program. Late top leader Deng Xiaoping warned against thro- wing weight about in wantonly criticizing or blaming others, (1) especially interfering with the business of other countries. (2) In line with this stance, China generally refrained from direct engagement in international crisis with no exception even for the first Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. But no longer so for the second one that broke out in October 2002. Beijing has been playing an active role in the crisis ever since then. Focusing on China’s policy toward the Korean nuclear issue since the outbreak of the second crisis, this article traces Beijing’s active involvement to lingering emotional attachment left over from the past, multiple state interests related to its security, political and economic concerns and its unshirkable international obligations. China’s insistence on a nuclear-free peninsula sought through a peaceful, multilateral settlement in opposition to provoking tension in the face of formidable difficulties has led to five rounds of six-party-talks under its auspices. This has eased the tension there through agreement of parties concerned on the principles for a peaceful settlement aimed at denuclearization — a diplomatic achievement winning worldwide acclaim. Along with further developments there, China needs to adjust its policy accordingly in response to the changing situation. Even so, it will still adhere to the principles noted above in an unswerving pursuit for a peaceful settlement through the Six-Party Talks.
出处 《Contemporary International Relations》 2006年第8期15-31,共17页 现代国际关系(英文版)
  • 相关文献

参考文献1

二级参考文献34

  • 1.《美推迟中国军力报告内幕》[N].《环球时报》,2005年6月13日.
  • 2Burt Herman, "Noah Korea Agrees to End Nuclear Program,"Associated Press, September 19, 2005.
  • 3Edward Cody, "U. S. Raises Objections to Chinese Proposal in North Korea Talks," Washinaton Post, September 18. 2005.
  • 4David E.Sanger and Wiiliam J. Broad,"UN Atom Chief Certain North Korea Has Made Fuel for 4 to 6 Bombs," New York Times, December 7,2004.
  • 5Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition : A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movemem, 1971 to the Present, Stanford:Stanford University Press, 2003.
  • 6James Clay Mohz and C. Kenneth Quinones, "Getting Serious about a Multilateral Approach to North Korea," The Nonproliferation Review,Spring 2004, pp. 136 - 144.
  • 7"N. Korea Threatens to Hold Missile Tests, Slams U.S. ," New York Times, March 2, 2005.
  • 8Time Out for North Korea,"Asia Times,August 9,2005.
  • 9"U. S. Threatens Korea Asset Freeze,"Beijing, China(Reuters)CNN. Com, September 17, 2005.
  • 10Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, "U. S. - Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open," New York Times, September 20, 2005.

共引文献6

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部