税务稽查委托代理模型

Principal-agent Model on Tax Inspection

本文在委托—代理理论框架下,讨论税务稽查监督问题.对影响税务稽查人员败德系数的因素进行分析,指出国家税务机关在设计“提高税务稽查人员敬业精神,减少败德行为发生”的激励机制时应首选——减少税务稽查人员的自由裁量权,加强税法刚性原则.

Within the frawewirk of the principal-agent theory,this article discusses the supervision of tax inspection. Based onthe analysis of the factors affecting the immoral coefficient of tax inspectors ,we point out theoretically that the reduction of the freedom of exercising jurisdiction and the intensification of the rigidity of tax law should be taken into account when state taxation organs design an effective mechanism for decreasing the immorality of the tax inspectors.