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中介主导的组合电子市场中商家间的联盟形成

Coalition formation of retailers in intermediary-driven combinatorial electronic marketplaces
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摘要 针对中介主导下组合贸易中商家间的联盟形成问题,在中介系统主导的组合电子市场模型的基础上,研究了多个商家如何通过联盟,形成相关商品的组合销售。根据在商品组合销售时,不应损害消费者及各商家的原有利益,同时吸引消费者进行组合购买,提出了3个相关原则,并给出了商家间如何确定组合销售时的商品价格参数才能满足上述原则的方法。中介系统主导的组合电子市场不仅可以增加各商家的利润,还可以降低消费者的支付,这种买卖双方均有利可图的贸易模式具有较高的市场价值。 To deal with coalition formation of different retailers in intermediary-driven combinatorial trading, a new intermediary-driven combinatorial electronic market model was presented. Then, coalition formation of retailers in these marketplaces was studied. Three principles aiming to guarantee benefits of retailers and purchasers and attract consumers to conduct combinatorial purchase were given. Furthermore, the method to define product price index for retailers in combinatorial trading was derived. This kind of intermediary-driven combinatorial electronic market model could not only increase profits of retailers but also decrease payment of purchasers. This trading pattern was beneficial for both sides of the combinatorial trading.
出处 《计算机集成制造系统》 EI CSCD 北大核心 2006年第9期1531-1536,共6页 Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371008)~~
关键词 电子商务 组合贸易 联盟形成 electronic commerce combinatorial trading coalition formation
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参考文献11

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