摘要
In order to provide integrity protection for the secure operating system to satisfy the structured protection class＇ requirements, a DTE technique based integrity protection formalization model is proposed after the implications and structures of the integrity policy have been analyzed in detail. This model consists of some basic rules for configuring DTE and a state transition model, which are used to instruct how the domains and types are set, and how security invariants obtained from initial configuration are maintained in the process of system transition respectively. In this model, ten invariants are introduced, especially, some new invariants dealing with information flow are proposed, and their relations with corresponding invariants described in literatures are also discussed. The thirteen transition rules with well-formed atomicity are presented in a well-operational manner. The basic security theorems correspond to these invariants and transition rules are proved. The rationalities for proposing the invariants are further annotated via analyzing the differences between this model and ones described in literatures. At last but not least, future works are prospected, especially, it is pointed out that it is possible to use this model to analyze SE-Linux security.
In order to provide integrity protection for the secure operating system to satisfy the structured protection class＇ requirements, a DTE technique based integrity protection formalization model is proposed after the implications and structures of the integrity policy have been analyzed in detail. This model consists of some basic rules for configuring DTE and a state transition model, which are used to instruct how the domains and types are set, and how security invariants obtained from initial configuration are maintained in the process of system transition respectively. In this model, ten invariants are introduced, especially, some new invariants dealing with information flow are proposed, and their relations with corresponding invariants described in literatures are also discussed. The thirteen transition rules with well-formed atomicity are presented in a well-operational manner. The basic security theorems correspond to these invariants and transition rules are proved. The rationalities for proposing the invariants are further annotated via analyzing the differences between this model and ones described in literatures. At last but not least, future works are prospected, especially, it is pointed out that it is possible to use this model to analyze SE-Linux security.
基金
supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation(Grant No.4052016)
the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.60573042)
the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of China(Grant No.G1999035802).
